Prediction markets
A price is a live probability. We cover how prices form, how oracles resolve a market, and why liquidity and the spread decide your real cost.
Market snapshot
A live look at current prediction markets.
live from Polymarket · 13 Oct 2026 18:50 UTC
| Market | Leading | Implied chance | Volume | Ends |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Democratic Presidential Nominee 2028 | Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez | 18% | $1.3B | 2028-11-08 |
| Presidential Election Winner 2028 | JD Vance | 21% | $709.1M | 2029-01-21 |
| Republican Presidential Nominee 2028 | J.D. Vance | 51% | $708.0M | 2028-11-08 |
| Next Prime Minister of Ethiopia? | Abiy Ahmed | 96% | $286.1M | 2029-01-01 |
| Brazil Presidential Election | Flávio Bolsonaro | 55% | $155.0M | 2026-10-04 |
| Next French Presidential Election | Marine Le Pen | 38% | $137.7M | 2027-04-18 |
| Netanyahu out by...? | Netanyahu out by end of 2026 | 46% | $124.4M | 2027-01-01 |
| Venezuela leader end of 2026? | Nicolás Maduro | 60% | $97.6M | 2027-01-01 |
| Kharg Island no longer under Iranian control by...? | Kharg Island no longer under Iranian contr | 6% | $74.3M | 2027-01-01 |
| Will the US confirm that aliens exist by...? | the US confirm that aliens exist before 20 | 4% | $70.3M | 2027-01-01 |
| Will the U.S. invade Iran before 2027? | Yes | 14% | $68.8M | 2027-01-01 |
| How many Fed rate cuts in 2026? | no Fed rate cuts happen in 2026 | 97% | $53.4M | 2027-01-01 |
| Will China invade Taiwan by end of 2026? | Yes | 4% | $42.8M | 2027-01-01 |
| California Governor Election Winner | Xavier Becerra | 95% | $41.3M | 2026-11-04 |
| Iran leader end of 2026? | Mojtaba Khamenei | 85% | $39.6M | 2026-12-31 |
A price is an implied probability, not a certainty.
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Dexsport sponsors this page; it is a sportsbook rather than a prediction market, and we are clear about the difference.
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On an order book, the link between price and probability is easiest to see in the odds themselves. If a contract paying out a fixed amount on a Yes outcome trades at a level that implies roughly a two-thirds chance, that number is not a forecast handed down by anyone; it is the point at which buyers and sellers have agreed to transact. Every purchase lifts the best offer and every sale presses the best bid, so the quoted price drifts with the weight of money rather than with anyone's opinion. Read the mid-price and you are reading the crowd's current consensus, updated with each fill.
Automated market makers make the same logic explicit. Instead of matching two parties directly, a pool prices trades along a curve, and each buy or sell moves the pool's balance and therefore the quote. The mechanism is different, but the meaning is identical: the marginal price at which the next trade clears is the market's implied probability at that instant. A price of a few cents on a long shot is not a claim that the event cannot happen, only that the money currently committed treats it as unlikely. When news lands and traders act, the curve shifts and the implied probability shifts with it.
This is why we treat price as the primary signal on the desk, and why oracle design matters as much as liquidity. A probability is only as good as the settlement it points to, so a market whose resolution source is vague or manipulable will trade at a discount to its true odds, with the gap reflecting that uncertainty rather than the underlying event. Where an oracle is clear, verifiable and resistant to interference, the price can be taken more or less at face value. Where it is not, the number on screen is a blend of the event and the risk of a disputed payout, and the two should be read separately.
When a market reaches its scheduled end, someone has to say what actually happened. That job falls to an oracle: the mechanism that reports the outcome on which settlement depends. In the simplest designs, a single operator or data feed declares the result and the market pays out accordingly. That is fast and cheap, but it concentrates trust in one party, and participants are effectively betting on the reporter being honest and correct as well as on the underlying event. More robust designs spread the reporting role across several independent sources, or let anyone propose an outcome that others can challenge by staking value against it. The economic weight behind a challenge is what gives the report teeth: a false claim can be disputed, and the disputing party stands to gain if the claim is overturned.
Almost every credible design includes a dispute window, a fixed period after the initial report during which the outcome can be contested before it becomes final. The length and rules of that window matter as much as the reporting itself. A short window settles positions quickly but leaves little time to catch an error or a manipulated feed. A longer one is safer but ties up capital and delays payouts. Equally important is who may dispute and what evidence counts. If disputes are decided by token holders voting on the outcome, the market is trusting that group to judge fairly; if they are decided by an external arbiter or a higher court of appeal, the trust shifts elsewhere. There is no design that removes trust entirely, only ones that relocate it and make it more expensive to abuse.
For anyone reading a price as a probability, the resolution rules are not fine print. They determine whether the number on screen reflects a clean estimate of the event or a muddier estimate that also prices in the risk of a bad report, a disputed outcome, or a payout that arrives late. Two markets that look identical can carry different resolution risk, and that difference should show up in the odds. Before treating any quote as the crowd's honest view of the likelihood, it is worth asking who reports the result, who can challenge it, how long the window stays open, and what happens if the dispute itself is never cleanly settled.
The Dutch market is licensed through the Kansspelautoriteit (KSA); offshore crypto books are not KSA-licensed. This guide is informational, not legal advice — check your own situation before you deposit.
Treat any offshore service with care: local consumer protections do not apply, set your own limits, and never stake money you cannot lose.
Through an order book or an automated market maker; each trade moves the price, and arbitrage keeps it near the consensus probability.
An oracle reports the real-world outcome that resolves a market; its design and dispute process decide how reliable that resolution is.
Elections have longer horizons, more ambiguous resolution and heavier regulation; sports resolve quickly on a clear result.
A thin market has a wide spread and heavy slippage, so your real cost to enter and exit can dwarf the edge you think you have.
No — a market price is set by traders and can move with your order; a sportsbook offers fixed odds with a built-in margin.
Longer reads from our team — how things work, the trade-offs, and what to check before you bet.
Dexsport offers clear prices and instant on-chain settlement where liquidity is scarce.
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